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ABSTRACT
We introduce generalized matching games defined on a graph G =
(V ,E) with an edge weightingw and a partition V = V1 ∪ · · · ∪Vn
of V . The player set is N = {1, . . . ,n}, and player p ∈ N owns the
vertices in Vp . The value v (S ) of coalition S ⊆ N is the maximum
weight of a matching in the subgraph of G induced by the vertices
owned by players in S . If |Vp | = 1 for every player p we obtain
the classical matching game. We prove that checking core non-
emptiness is polynomial-time solvable if |Vp | ≤ 2 for each p and
co-NP-hard if |Vp | ≤ 3 for each p. We do so via pinpointing a
relationship with b-matching games and also settle the complexity
classification on testing core non-emptiness for b-matching games.
We propose generalized matching games as a suitable model for
international kidney exchange programs, where the vertices in
V correspond to patient-donor pairs and each Vp represents one
country. For this setting we prove a number of complexity results.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The assignment game is a TU-game defined on a weighted bipartite
graph, where the nodes are the agents and the value of a coalition
is the maximum weight of a matching in the induced subgraph
[33]. The core of any assignment game is always non-empty and
can be computed efficiently [33]. The matching game is its general-
ization to non-bipartite graphs, where the core can be empty, but
the problem of finding a core element (if it exists) is polynomial
time solvable [9]. The multiple partners assignment game [35] and
the b-matching game [10] are natural generalizations of the assign-
ment and matching game, respectively, where the agents may be
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involved in multiple pairs up to their capacities (i.e. we consider
b-matchings). The core is again nonempty in the bipartite case [34].
For the non-bipartite case, deciding if a given allocation is in the
core is co-NP-hard already with capacities b ≤ 3 and tractable for
b ≤ 2 [10]. The complexity of deciding if the core of a b-matching
game is nonempty was left open for b ≤ 3 in [10]. In Section 4 we
solve this open problem by proving co-NP-hardness even for unit
weights.
In Section 3 we introduce a second generalization of the assign-
ment game, called generalized matching game, which is defined
on a weighted (arbitrary) graph G, whose node set is partitioned
into sets, and these sets form the agents of the game. The value
of a coalition is again the maximum weight of a matching in the
corresponding induced subgraph of G. We show a close relation-
ship between generalized matching games and b-matching games
regarding core non-emptiness. By combining this relationship with
the results for b-matching games, we prove in Section 4 that testing
core non-emptiness is co-NP-hard for generalized matching games
in which each set has size at most 3, even for unit weights, and
polynomial-time solvable if each set has size at most 2.
As a strong motivation for the generalized matching game we
consider international kidney exchange schemes in Europe and
multi-hospital exchange schemes in the US. In both cases the nodes
represent patient-donor pairs, but the agents represent sets of coun-
tries in the first case and sets of hospitals in the second case. The
matching edges correspond to pairwise kidney exchanges, where
edge weights represent the quality of the transplants (or number of
transplants in the unit weighted case). As “fair” target solutions we
initially propose to take core solutions. This leads to the computa-
tional challenge of finding a maximum weight matching such that
the utilities realized by the countries (or hospitals) are as close as
possible to the target shares. In Section 5 we show the tractability
of this problem for unit weights, but prove NP-hardness for various
weighted scenarios. The deviation between the target and realized
solutions are recorded as credits, which are taken into account in
the subsequent matching runs; we assume that the matching runs
take place in regular time intervals, e.g. in every three months (as
usual in Europe). Below we discuss this application in more detail.
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2 INTERNATIONAL KIDNEY EXCHANGE
For kidney failure, transplantation is currently the most effective
treatment, but there is a shortage on deceased donors and waiting
lists are long. A patient may have a willing donor, but a kidney
transplant might not be possible due to blood- or tissue-type incom-
patibilities. However, patients and donors may be swapped after all
patient-donor pairs are pooled together. A kidney exchange program
(KEP) is a centralized program where the goal is to find an optimal
kidney exchange scheme in some pool of patient-donor pairs.
One can model the above problem via a compatibility graph,
which is a directed graph D = (V ,A) with an arc weightingw . Each
vertex inV represents a patient-donor pair, and there is an arc from
patient-donor pair i to patient-donor pair j if the donor of pair i
is compatible with the patient of pair j. The associated weightwi j
indicates the utility of the transplant. An exchange cycle is a directed
cycleC in D. The weight of a cycleC is the sum of the weights of its
arcs. An exchange scheme X is the union of pairwise vertex-disjoint
exchange cycles of D. The weight of X is the sum of the weights
of its cycles. The aim is to find an exchange scheme of maximum
weight, subject to a fixed exchange bound ℓ, which is an upper bound
on the length of the exchange cycles that may be used. The reason
for the latter is that kidneys are usually transplanted simultaneously
and large exchange cycles may cause logistical difficulties.
Although KEPs are not legalized in some countries, national
KEPs exist in many countries all over the world [20] including
ten European countries [8]. For example, in the French and the
Swedish KEPs the exchange bound is ℓ = 2 [3], whereas ℓ = 3 in the
UK [24, 29] and ℓ = 4 in the Netherlands [14]. Setting ℓ ≥ 3 changes
the complexity of the problem from polynomial-time solvable, via
solving a matching problem, to NP-hard [1]. In the latter case the
problem is usually solved via integer programming techniques (see
e.g. [1]). In fact, NP-hardness is not a major obstacle, as in many
countries the size of the KEP pool (the setV ) is small. To find better
solutions, one can merge KEP pools of different countries to obtain
larger KEP pools. This leads to international KEPs, which are still in
their initial stages. For instance, the pools of the Austrian and Czech
KEPs have recently been joined [12]. Scandiatransplant will organ-
ise the international KEP of Sweden, Norway and Denmark [3].
Other examples include initial agreements between France and
Switzerland, and between Portugal, Spain and Italy [7].
We model an international KEP by partitioning the vertex set V
of a compatibility graph D = (V ,A) into setsV1, . . . ,Vn , where n is
the number of countries involved andVp is the set of patient-donor
pairs of country p. The objective is still to maximize social welfare,
that is, to find an exchange scheme of D that has maximum weight
subject to the given exchange bound ℓ. We can compute such a
scheme as before. However, apart from a number of ethical and legal
issues which we will not discuss here, we now have an additional
problem to solve. Namely, in order to ensure full participation, it is
crucial that proposed exchange schemes will be accepted by each of
the participating countries. This is a highly non-trivial issue.
Example 1. Let D be a compatibility graph with vertices i1, i2, j
and arcs (i1, i2), (i2, i1), (i2, j ), (j, i2) with weights 1 − ϵ, 1 − ϵ, 1, 1,
respectively, for some small ϵ . Let V1 = {i1, i2} and V2 = {j}. The
optimum solution is an exchange between i2 and j with weight 2.
However, the in-house solution of V1 consisting of the exchange
between i1 and i2 (with weight 2 − 2ϵ) is better forV1, as then both
patients in the pairs i1 and i2 receive a kidney, and with more or less
the same chance of success, so, (i1, i2) is “easy-to-match” in-house.
Example 1 illustrates the problem of countries having an incentive
to hide their easy-to-match pairs and only register their hard-to-
match pairs to the international KEP. For instance, in the US large
hospitals take up the role of “local KEPs” and conduct around 62%
of the transplantations in-house and only 38% with the help of the
three nationwide KEPs (UNOS, APD, NKR). This fragmentation is
highly inefficient [2]. Proposed solutions use amatchingmechanism
ensuring that full hospital participation is individually rational [5,
6]. The tradeoff between optimality and strategy-proofness (with
regard to reporting the full pools) has also been investigated in
recent theoretical papers [4, 11, 37]. The same goal was behind
the concept of a credit system, where hospitals are rewarded for
disclosing their patient-donor pairs [23]. Indeed, among the three
nationwide KEPs in the US, NKR is considered to be the most
successful, partly due to their strong financial incentives for full
participation and a credit system for patient-donor pair registration;
each hospital is assigned a “Liquidity Score” based on the relative
number of easy-to-match patients a hospital is bringing to the pool.
The kidney exchange collaborations of the European countries
differ from the collaboration of US hospitals in many respects. In
Europe the countries register their pools fully due to their strict
national protocols. In the US this can only be achieved by giving in-
centives to the hospitals. In Europe the matching runs are typically
conducted once every three months. In the US this is done more or
less on-line on a daily basis. Both systems also have different health
care practices, e.g. with respect to the use of desensitization.
The goal of the international kidney exchange problem is to offer
kidney exchange schemes of maximum weight in the compatibility
graph that are acceptable for each of the participating countries.
Our goal is to provide a fundamental basis for this problem with a
focus on the European setting. For this setting we also propose a
credit system, but the above differences with the US setting explains
why we will base our credit system on flexible game-theoretical fair
shares rather than pre-defined scores for each type of patient-donor
pair, as done in the US.We emphasize that our suggestion to use core
allocations as initial target solutions for international cooperations
is not to avoid ad-hoc blocking by coalitions of countries in the KEP
but to guarantee fair, mutual long-term benefits for all parties. We
describe our model in more detail in the next section, where we
also discuss some related work that inspired our research [13, 26].
3 GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
A (cooperative) game is a pair (N ,v ), where N is a set of n players
and v : 2N → R+ is a value function with v (∅) = 0. If v (N ) ≥
v (S1) + · · · + v (Sr ) for every partition (S1, . . . , Sr ) of N , then the
players may form the grand coalition N . Under this assumption, the
central problem is then how to distributev (N ) amongst the players.
An allocation is a vector x ∈ RN with x (N ) = v (N ), where x (S ) =∑
p∈S xp for S ⊆ N . The core of a game consists of all allocations
x ∈ RN satisfying x (S ) ≥ v (S ) for each S ⊆ N . Core allocations
are highly desirable, as they offer no incentive for a subset S of
players to leave N and form a coalition on their own. So core
allocations ensure that the grand coalition N is stable. However, the
2
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core may be empty, and the next problem may be computationally
hard (assuming a “compact” description of the input).
Core Non-Emptiness
Instance: A game (N ,v ).
Question: Is the core of (N ,v ) nonempty?
We introduce the notion of a generalized matching game (N ,v ),
defined on an undirected graph G = (V ,E) with a positive edge
weightingw and partition (V1, . . . ,Vn ) ofV . We set N = {1, . . . ,n}.
For S ⊆ N , we letV (S ) = ⋃p∈S Vp . The value v (S ) of coalition S is
the maximum weight of a matching in the subgraph of G induced
by V (S ). If Vp = {p} for p = 1, . . . ,n, then we obtain a matching
game [9, 15, 17, 25, 27]. Hence, generalized matching games are
matching games where one player may own more than one vertex.
Such games are well suited to model the international kidney ex-
change problem. To explain this, we first assume that the exchange
bound ℓ = 2. The reason for this assumption is that ℓ = 2 is used
in several countries and there is no universally agreed exchange
bound. Moreover, for ℓ = 2, we can compute a maximum weight
exchange scheme in polynomial time. We modify a compatibility
graph D = (V ,A) into an undirected graph D = (V ,E) by adding an
edge between two vertices i and j of V if and only if both (i, j ) and
(j, i ) belong toA. We give each edge ij weightw (ij ) = wi j +w ji . We
obtain a maximum weight exchange scheme of (D,w ) by comput-
ing a maximumweight matching in (D,w ), which takes polynomial
time [16]. We say that (D,w ) is the weighted graph that underlies
(D,w ). For the international kidney exchange problem, a player p
represents a country p with set of patient-donor pairs Vp and coun-
try size |Vp |. For S ⊆ N , the set V (S ) = ⋃p∈S Vp is the union of
all patient-donor pairs in the countries of S . We justify our model
below.
The goal of an international KEP is to form the grand coalition N
and to keep N stable. For a generalized matching game (N ,v ) it
holds thatv (N ) ≥ v (S1)+· · ·+v (Sr ) for every partition (S1, . . . , Sr )
of N . However, as seen from Example 1, even 2-country coalitions
may not be stable. Moreover, it is illegal to pay for kidneys and
thus we cannot associate any monetary value with them. Hence,
we cannot distribute the total value v (N ) among the participating
countries according to some allocation x . Just as proposed in [26],
we overcome both obstacles by following the solution of the US
and proposing a credit system. We do this, because optimal kidney
exchange schemes are usually computed three or four times each
year. Hence, we can level out discrepancies in single rounds so
that, on average, social welfare does get allocated in a manner that
encourages the participating countries to stay in the grand coalition.
For a certain round, let (N ,v ) be a generalized matching game
defined by a compatibility graph (D,w ) with country partitionV .
Assume we are given a “fair” allocation y together with a credit
function c : N → R, which satisfies ∑p∈N cp = 0 where cp is the
credit that country p has received in the past. Then, for p = 1, . . . ,n,
we set xp = yp + cp . Note that x is again an allocation, as y is
an allocation and ∑p∈N cp = 0. Recall that we maximize social
welfare and hence only consider the maximum weight matchings
of (D,w ). LetM denote the set of all maximum weight matchings
of (D,w ). For p ∈ N , a utility function up gives for eachM ∈ M, a
utility up (M ), which expresses the worth ofM for p. The aim is to
chose a maximum weight matchingM ∈ M with up (M ) “as close
as possible” to xp for each country p. Afterwards we compute a
new credit function for the next round and repeat the process.
Note that we do not use allocations to distribute v (N ), but in-
stead use them to find an acceptable sequence of maximum weight
matchingsM0,M1,M2, . . . for all participating countries. To keep
our model as general as possible, we did not specify the credit func-
tion c , utility function u, allocation y or norm | | · | |. We give specific
examples later and define the following problem.
Allocation Approximation
Instance: A generalized matching game (N ,v ) defined by a
compatibility graph (D,w ) and partitionV ; an al-
location x ; and a constant δ .
Question: Does (D,w ) have a maximum weight matchingM
such that | |xp − up (M ) | | ≤ δ for p = 1, . . . ,n?
This problem is trivial for graphs with a unique maximum weight
matching, which is highly likely when weightswi j take many dif-
ferent values at random [30]. However, in our context, we mainly
consider compatibility graphs with only a small number of different
weights. The reason is that to overcome certain blood and antigen
incompatibilities, patients can undergo one or more desensitization
treatments to match with their willing donor. After full desensiti-
zation the chance on a successful kidney transplant is almost the
same as in the case of full compatibility. Allowing desensitization
results in compatibility graphs with weights either 1 (when no de-
sensitization was needed) or 1 − ϵ (after applying desensitization).
As ϵ is small, it is sometimes even assumed thatw ≡ 1.
All features of our model are present in the forthcoming interna-
tional KEP between Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, where ℓ = 2,
desensitization is possible, and the size of the solution is the first
priority [3].
Related Work. Carvalho et al. [13] also modelled international
KEPs using game theory. They mainly considered the situation
with two countries, ℓ = 2, no credit system, and matching runs
over two stages. In the first stage each country decides which in-
house exchanges they conduct and in the second stage a maximum
matching is selected for the patient-donor pairs registered for the
international exchange. Klimentova et al. [26] considered interna-
tional KEPs with a credit system. The differences with our model
are as follows: 1) they allow ℓ ≥ 3, whereas we set ℓ = 2; 2) they
use a particular individually rational solution concept for comput-
ing fair allocations based on marginal contributions, whereas we
suggest the core of the corresponding generalized matching game;
and 3) they consider only the size of the solutions, whereas we
also investigate the weighted case, where the scores represent the
utilities of the transplants. They also performed simulations using
integer programming techniques for investigating the long-term
effects of their compensation policy.
Gourvès, Monnot and Pascua [21] considered a variant of gen-
eralized matching games where organizations own a number of
vertices in a market situation. Their goal differs from ours and is
to find an individually rational maximum weight matching (which
gives each organization p at least the value that it can obtain on
its own). They also proved complexity results in this setting for
several parameters, such as the number of organizations, number
of weights and maximum degree.
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4 CORE NON-EMPTINESS
Here we show our results for Core Non-Emptiness for b-matching
and generalized matching games. For a vertex capacity function
b, a b-matching in an undirected graph G = (V ,E) is a subset
M ⊆ E such that each i ∈ V is incident to at most bi edges in
M . A b-matching game is a game (N ,v ) on an undirected graph
G = (N ,E) with edge weightingw , such that for S ⊆ N , v (S ) is the
maximum weight of a b-matching in the subgraph of G induced
by S . A matching game is a 1-matching game. It is well known that
Core Non-Emptiness is polynomial-time solvable for matching
games; see [9] for an O (nm + n2 logn)-time algorithm. In [10] it
was shown that deciding if an allocation belongs to the core of a
b-matching game is polynomial-time solvable if b ≤ 2 and co-NP-
complete ifb ≡ 3. The first result implies thatCore Non-Emptiness
is polynomial-time solvable for b-matching games with b ≤ 2 [10].
However, the case where b ≰ 2 was left open. We prove it is co-
NP-hard even ifw ≡ 1 and bi ≤ 3 for every i ∈ N . By pinpointing
a relationship with generalized matching games, we also prove
that Core Non-Emptiness problem is co-NP-hard for generalized
matching games even whenw ≡ 1 and country sizes ≤ 3. As such,
we first show the following reduction.
Theorem 4.1. The Core Non-Emptiness problem for generalized
matching games with country size ≤ c reduces to the Core Non-
Emptiness problem for b-matching games with capacities b ≤ c .
Proof. We assume c ≥ 2 as for c = 1 both problems are identical.
Let (N ,v ) be a generalized matching game defined by a graph
G = (V ,E) with edge weights w and partition V = (V1, . . . ,Vn )
of the vertex set. We construct a corresponding b-matching game
(N ,v ), defined by a graph G = (N ,E) (where N ⊇ V and E ⊇ E),
edge weightsw and node capacities b as follows. For each Vi , we
add a new root node ri that is adjacent to all nodes in Vi and no
other nodes in G. Thus in total we add n new nodes and |V | new
edges. Every new edge gets weight 2W whereW > v (N ). Let R be
the set of root nodes. This completes our description of G = (N ,E)
on vertex set N = V ∪ R. All nodes in V get capacity b = 2 and
each node ri ∈ R gets capacity |Vi |. Let (N ,v ) be the corresponding
b-matching game. We claim that (N ,v ) has non-empty core if and
only if (N ,v ) has so.
“⇒:” Suppose x ∈ core(N ,v ). For i = 1, . . . ,n, we let x :≡ xi|Vi | +W
on Vi and xri := |Vi |W . We claim that x ∈ core(N ,v ). Indeed,
x (N ) = v (N ) = v (N ) + |V |2W by definition. To check the core
constraints, consider S ⊆ N . Let S := {i | S ∩Vi , ∅}. A maximum
weight b-matching inG[S] is obtained by matching each root node
ri ∈ S to all its neighbors in S and matching the nodes in S ∩V to
each other in the best possible way. Thusv (S ) ≤ v (S )+∑i :ri ∈S |S∩
Vi |2W , while x (S ) = ∑i ∈S ( |S∩Vi ||Vi | xi + |S ∩Vi |W ) +∑i :ri ∈S |Vi |W .
Comparing the two values, we find that the core constraint x (S ) ≥
v (S ) holds unless S = ⋃i ∈S Vi ∪ {ri }. In the latter case, however,
v (S ) = v (S ) +
∑
i ∈S |Vi |2W and x (S ) = x (S ) +∑i ∈S |Vi |2W , so that
the core constraint follows from x (S ) ≥ v (S ).
“⇐:” Assume core(N ,v ) = ∅. By the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem,
there are coalitions Sq ⊆ N and λq ≥ 0 such that∑q λqSq = N and∑
q λqv (Sq ) > v (N ) (here, for convenience, we identify coalitions
Sq and N with their corresponding incidence vectors in Rn ). Define
corresponding coalitions Sq :=
⋃{Vi ∪ {ri } | i ∈ Sq } in (N ,v ). A
maximumweightb-matching inG[Sq ] is obtained bymatching each
root ri ∈ Sq to all nodes in Vi and matching Sq ∩V in an optimal
way. Thus v (Sq ) = v (Sq ) + |Vq |2W . Hence, again writing coali-
tions as incidence vectors, ∑q λqSq = ∑q λq (∑i ∈Sq Vi + {ri }) =∑
i (
∑
q:i ∈Sq λq ) (Vi + {ri }) =
∑
i (Vi + {ri }) = N and, similarly,∑
q λqv (Sq ) =
∑
q λqv (
⋃
i ∈Sq Vi ∪ {ri }) =
∑
q λqv (Sq ) + |V |2W >
v (N ) + |V |2W = v (N ), showing that also core(N ,v ) = ∅. □
As Core Non-Emptiness is polynomial-time solvable for b-
matching games with b ≤ 2 [10], we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.2. Core Non-Emptiness is polynomial time solv-
able for generalized matching games with country size ≤ 2.
Contrary to above, our next reduction reduces instances with
uniform weightsw = 1 to instances with uniform weights.
Theorem 4.3. The Core Non-Emptiness problem for b-matching
games with b ≤ c reduces to the Core Non-Emptiness problem for
generalized matching games with country sizes ≤ c . The transforma-
tion can be done so that uniform weight instances of b-matching are
transformed to uniform weight instances of generalized matching.
Proof. Let (N ,v ) be a b-matching game defined by G = (V ,E),
edge weights w and node capacities b. We construct a weighted
graphG = (V ,E) with partitionV of its vertex set such that the cor-
responding generalized matching game has a non-empty core if and
only if core(N ,v ) is non-empty. To this end we apply a classical con-
struction of Tutte [38] that is generally used to reduce b-matching
to standard matching problems. This works as follows. Each node
i ∈ V of capacity bi gets replaced by bi copies i (s ) , s = 1, . . . ,bi .
Secondly, each edge ij ∈ E gets replaced by a tree Ti j connecting
the copies of i to the copies of j . The tree consists of a central edge
with endpoints i j and ji . Node i j is adjacent to all copies of i and,
similarly, ji is adjacent to all copies of j (see also Figure 1). All edges
in Ti j get weight wi j . Denote the resulting graph by G = (V ,E).
The idea is that any b-matching M in G can be represented by a
corresponding matching M ⊆ E in G as follows. If e = ij ∈ M ,
then we match i j to some copy of i in G and, similarly, ji to some
copy of j. (Note that, by definition, enough copies of i resp. j are
available.) If e = ij < M , then we match i j and ji to each other
in G. The resulting matching M in G then has size |E | + |M | and
weightw (E) +w (M ). We refer toM as a transform ofM . (Different
transforms differ by the choice of copies of node i that are “matched”
to j .) The partition ofV is the obvious one with blocksVi consisting
of all copies of i and 2-node blocks Ei j = {i j , ji }. This completes the
description of the generalized matching game (N ,v ). Note that the
players in N are in 1− 1 correspondence withV ∪E = N ∪E, so we
sometimes also identify them with V ∪ E. We claim that core(N ,v )
is non-empty if and only if core(N ,v ) is non-empty.
“⇒:” Letx ∈ core(N ,v ), assumeM is amaximumweightb-matching
in G (so v (N ) = w (M )) and define an allocation x on N by setting
x (Vi ) := xi for i ∈ N and x (Ei j ) = wi j . Then x ∈ core(N ,v ). Indeed,
first observe that a maximum weight matching in G is a transform
M of M , so v (N ) = w (M ) = v (N ) + w (E). Thus x (N ) = v (N )
4
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i j
i (1)
i (2)
i (3)
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j (2)
j (3)
Figure 1: Tutte’s gadget replacing an edge e = ij.
indeed. To check the core constraints, consider a coalition S ⊆ N .
Let S ⊆ V be the union of all blocks in S . Then v (S ) is the weight
of a maximum weight matching in G[S]. The latter is obtained as
a transform of a maximum weight b-matchingM in G[S ∩V ]. So
v (S ) = w (M ) +w (E[S]) and x (S ) = ∑i, j :Ei j ⊆S wi j +∑i :Vi ⊆S xi =
w (E[S])+x (S∩V ) ≥ v (S ) because x (S∩V ) ≥ w (M ) by assumption.
“⇐:” Assume core(N ,v ) = ∅. By the Bondareva-Shapley Theo-
rem, there are λq ≥ 0 and Sq ⊆ V such that ∑ λqSq = N and∑
λqv (Sq ) > v (N ). Let Sq :=
⋃{Vi | i ∈ Sq } ∪ ⋃{Ei j | i, j ∈ Sq }.
Then (the incidence vector of) ∑ λqSq equals 1 on N = V and is
at most 1 on N \ N = E. By setting λi j = 1 − ∑q:Ei j ⊆Sq λq , we
construct a non-negative combination N = ∑q λqSq +∑i j λi jEi j .
To show thatv (N ) < ∑q λqv (Sq )+∑i j λi jv (Ei j ), letMq be a max-
imum weight b-matching in G[Sq ]. ThenMq has weightw (Mq ) +
w (E[Sq ]) inG[Sq ]. Sov (Sq ) ≥ v (Sq )+w (E[Sq ]). Hence∑q λqv (Sq )+∑
i j λi jv (Ei j ) ≥ ∑q λq (v (Sq ) +w (E[Sq])) +∑i j λi jwi j > v (N ) +∑
e (
∑
q:e ∈E (Sq ) λq )we +
∑
i j λi jwi j = v (N ) +w (E) = v (N ). □
We identify a b-matchingM in a graph G with the subgraph of
G induced by M (subgraph of G consisting of all edges in M and
vertices covered by M). We speak about (connected) components
ofM . For instance, for b = 1, every edge e ∈ M is a component.
Lemma 4.4. Let (N ,v ) be a b-matching game on weighted graph
(G,w ) with a nonempty core. Let x be a core allocation of (N ,v ) and
M be a maximum weight matching of G. Then, for every component
C ofM , it holds that x (C ) = w (C ).
Theorem 4.5. CoreNon-Emptiness is co-NP-hard forb-matching
games with b ≤ 3, even ifw ≡ 1. The same holds for (uniform weight)
generalized matching games with country size ≤ 3.
Proof. Due to Theorem 4.3 it suffices to prove the first statement.
The proof is by reduction from the 3-Regular Subgraph problem,
which is to decide if a given graph has a 3-regular subgraph (a
graph is 3-regular if every vertex has degree 3). This problem is NP-
complete even for bipartite graphs [36]. Actually, we use a slight
variant that might be called the Nearly 3-Regular Subgraph
problem: given a (non-bipartite) graph, decide if it has a subgraph
with all nodes of degree 3 except for one node of degree 2. This is
NP-complete as well: given an instance of 3-Regular Subgraph,
i.e., a bipartite graph (U ∪V ,E), construct the non-bipartite graphG
consisting of |E | disjoint copies of (U ∪ V ,E) where in the copy
corresponding to e ∈ E the edge e is subdivided by a new node, say
ve . Then (U ∪V ,E) has a 3-regular subgraph if and only ifG has a
nearly 3-regular subgraph. Indeed, if there is a 3-regular subgraph
in (U ∪ V ,E) that contains the edge e , there will be an almost 3-
regular subgraph in G whose degree 2 node is ve . Conversely, if
there is an almost 3-regular subgraph in G, it must contain a node
v
av,1 av,2 av,3
bv,1 cv,1 bv,2 cv,2 bv,3 cv,3
Figure 2: Attached triangles (av ,bv , cv ) and r omitted.
ve for some e , because otherwise the subgraph would be bipartite,
but an almost 3-regular graph cannot be bipartite.
We reduce from Nearly 3-Regular Subgraph for non-bipartite
graphs. Given an instance G = (V ,E) of the latter, we construct a
graphG with vertex capacities bi ≤ 3 and edge weightsw = 1 such
that G has a nearly 3-regular subgraph if and only if the weighted
b-matching game on (G,w ) has an empty core. We construct G as
follows. To every vertex v of G we attach three edges vav,1, vav,2
and vav,3. Each of the three new vertices av, j , for j = 1, 2, 3, is
part of a triangle with vertices av, j ,bv, j , cv, j . Vertex capacities are
bv = 3 for all “original” vertices v ∈ V and bw = 2 on all new
“triangle” vertices w . Finally, for each v ∈ V there is a vertex av
of capacity b = 3 that is adjacent to all three vertices av, j , for
j = 1, 2, 3. Similarly, there are vertices bv and cv , adjacent to bv, j ,
for j = 1, 2, 3 and cv, j , for j = 1, 2, 3, resp. Finally, we add a root node
r that is adjacent to all v ∈ V and none of the other (new) nodes.
The root r has capacity br = 1. This completes the description of
G = (V ,E) with corresponding vertex capacitiesb and edge weights
w = 1. See also Figure 2.
We next describe a maximum weight matching (as indicated in
Figure 2) in G. Let M consist of all edges vav, j plus all edges of
the form bv, jcv, j plus all edges incident to av ,bv and cv . ThusM
saturates all nodes except r , soM is a maximum (weight) matching.
First supposeG contains no nearly 3-regular subgraph. We claim
that in this case x ≡ 32 on the vertices inV , x ≡ 1 on the vertices of
each triangle, x ≡ 32 on the “connector” vertices av ,bv , cv (v ∈ V )
and xr = 0 yields a core allocation. Obviously we have x (V ) =
w (M ) = |M |. To show that x satisfies the core constraints, suppose
to the contrary that there exists a blocking coalition, i.e., a vertex set
S ⊆ V with corresponding maximum weight matchingMS in the
subgraph induced by S such that x (S ) < |MS |. Assume furthermore
that S is a (w.r.t. set inclusion) minimal blocking coalition. Since xi
equals half the capacity of each vertex except r , this can only happen
if S contains r andMS saturates all vertices in S . So, in particular
MS contains some edge rv0,v0 ∈ V . AsMS saturates all nodes in
S , v0 must be matched by MS to two more nodes (other than r ).
Assume first that all v ∈ S ∩V \ {v0} are either matched “down” to
av,1,av,2,av,3 by three matching edges inMS or matched “up” by
three matching edges e ∈ MS ∩ E. If v ∈ V ∩ S is matched down to
its three triangles, then the component ofM containing these three
edges joining v to its triangles is paid exactly its value (all vertices
in the component are saturated and each vertex gets exactly half of
its capacity except v). Removing the component ofM containing v
from S thus results in a smaller blocking set S ′ ⊂ S , contradicting
the minimality of S . Thus, all vertices v ∈ S ∩V ,v , v0 must be
matched “up”. If alsov0 is matched “up” by two edges inMS∩E, then
(S ∩ V ,MS ) is a nearly 3-regular subgraph of G, a contradiction.
So we are left to deal with the case where there exists a vertex
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v ∈ S ∩V that is, say, matched down by some edge e = vav,1 ∈ MS
but, say, e ′ = vav,3 < MS . We distinguish the following cases:
Case 1. av ,bv , cv ∈ S . Since all these are saturated by MS , we
have all av, j ,bv, j , cv, j ∈ S . Thus av,3,bv,3, cv,3 ∈ S and each of
these is already matched to av ,bv , cv , resp. Since vav,3 < MS , at
most two of av,3,bv,3, cv,3 can be saturated byMS , a contradiction.
Case 2. av ,bv ∈ S, cv < S . Again we find that av,1,av,2,av,3 ∈
S andbv,1,bv,2,bv,3 ∈ S . Moreover, each of these is alreadymatched
by some edge inMS to av or bv . In addition, av,1 is matched to v ,
so av,1 is “already” saturated. Hence, in order to saturate also bv,1,
MS must contain bv,1cv,1. Hence, cv,1 ∈ S andMS cannot saturate
it (as cv < S), a contradiction.
Case 3. av ∈ S,bv , cv < S . Here we conclude av,1,av,2,av,3 ∈ S .
Sincevav,3 < MS , av,3 can only be saturated if, say, av,3bv,3 ∈ MS
and hence bv,3 ∈ S . The latter can only be saturated by bv,3cv,3 ∈
MS . Hence, cv,3 ∈ S and this cannot be saturated (since av,3bv,3 ∈
MS would imply that av,3 is already saturated from edges inside
its triangle, so av cannot be saturated any more), a contradiction.
Case 4. av < S . Since av,1 is in S , it must be saturated, and
as av < S , either av,1bv,1 or av,1cv,1 ∈ MS . By symmetry, sup-
pose that av,1bv,1 ∈ MS . Then bv,1 is in S and must be saturated,
so either bv,1bv ∈ MS (and cv,1 must be uncovered by MS ) or
bv,1cv,1 ∈ MS . In the first case bv ∈ S and cv < S , in the second
case bv < S and cv ∈ S (as cv,1 can only be saturated by cv,1cv ). In
both cases we get a contradiction when considering the third tri-
angle, as follows. If bv ∈ S and cv < S , then we have bvbv,3 ∈ MS .
Thus bv,3 is in S and must be saturated, i.e., matched to either av,3
or cv,3. In the first case av,3 must be matched to cv,3 and the latter
remains unsaturated, a contradiction. In the second case, cv,3 must
be saturated by matching it to av,3 and then again, the latter must
remain unsaturated. The case cv ∈ S and bv < S is similar. From
cv ∈ S we conclude that cvcv,3 ∈ MS . Thus cv,3 ∈ S and this must
be matched to either av,3 or bv,3. In the first case, av,3 must be
matched to bv,3 (as av is not available) and bv,3 remains unsatu-
rated. In the second case bv,3 must be matched to av,3 and again,
the latter remains unsaturated, a contradiction.
Now suppose the b-matching game on G has a core allocation x .
Fix any v ∈ V and let Sab := {av ,bv ,av, j ,bv, j | j = 1, 2, 3}. As
Sab allows a saturating matching Mab of size |Mab | = 9, we find
that x (Sab ) ≥ 9. Similarly, x (Sbc ) ≥ 9 and x (Sac ) ≥ 9 for Sbc and
Sac defined analogously. Adding all three inequalities and dividing
by 2 yields x (S ) ≥ 27/2 for S := Sab ∪ Sbc ∪ Sac . The set S ∪ {v}
is covered exactly by two components of the maximum weight
matchingM in G. Hence, by Lemma 4.4 we obtain x (S ∪ {v}) = 15
and xr = 0, so xv ≤ 32 . As this holds for all v ∈ V , any nearly
3-regular subgraph G ′ = (S, F ) of G with distinguished node v0 of
degree 2 would define a blocking coalition S ∪ {r }. Indeed, the edge
set F ∪ {rv0} matches each node in S up to its capacity, while x
assigns only half this value to each node in S and zero to r , implying
x (S ) < v (S ), contrary to our assumption that x is in the core. So
there can be no nearly 3-regular subgraph. □
5 ALLOCATION APPROXIMATION
Recall that to keep the Allocation Approximation problem as
general as possible, we did not specify the credit function c , utility
function u, allocation x and distance norm | | · | |. We note that c is
irrelevant for our problem and that x is part of the input (although
we argued to let x be a core allocation). Hence, we only need to
define the utility function u and norm | | · | |. As norm we choose
the classical norm |a − b | for two numbers a,b. As to the utilities
up (M ), there are two natural options.
Cardinalities.Wemay defineup (M ) as the total number of incom-
ing kidneys for country p by M ∈ M. That is, let up (M ) = sp (M )
for p = 1, . . . ,n, where sp (M ) is the size of the setMD (p) = {(i, j ) ∈
A| ij ∈ M, j ∈ Vp }, or equivalently, sp (M ) = |{j ∈ Vp | ∃i ∈ V : ij ∈
M }|. See Figure 3 for an example. This is a natural utility func-
tion due to its simplicity and because in practice the weightswi j
are sparsely spread (see Section 3). Using sp also has a computa-
tional advantage. Namely, we prove that for up = sp , Allocation
Approximation is polynomial-time solvable. For example, given
an allocation x and constant δ , we can find in polynomial time
some M ∈ M (if it exists) such that sp (M ) ∈ [xp − δ ,xp + δ] for
p = 1, . . . ,n.
Weights.Wemay defineup (M ) as the total weight of the incoming
kidneys for p. That is, let up (M ) = tp (M ) for p = 1, . . . ,n, where
tp (M ) =
∑
i, j :i j ∈M, j ∈Vp wi j (see also Figure 3). If w ≡ 1 on D,
then tp = sp and we can solve Allocation Approximation in
polynomial time, see above. If n = 1, then the problem is trivially
polynomial-time solvable, as t1 (M ) is the same for everyM ∈ M.
If all country sizes are 1, we obtain a matching game, and we will
also prove polynomial-time solvability. However, if the number of
different weights is 2 in both (D,w ) and (D,w ) or if n = 2, then we
prove NP-hardness. We also prove NP-hardness if country sizes
are ≤ 2, but only if we assume some compact description of the
input. The case wherew ≡ 1 on D (butw . 1 in D) turns out to be
polynomially equivalent with Exact Perfect Matching [31], a
well-known problem whose complexity is yet unknown.
We prove the following result for up = sp ; a similar construction
was used by Plesnik [32] to solve a constrained matching problem.
Theorem 5.1. Given a generalized matching game (N ,v ) on a
weighted graph (G,w ), and closed intervals I1, . . . , In , it is possible
in polynomial time to decide if there exists a matchingM ∈ M with
sp (M ) ∈ Ip for p = 1, . . . ,n, and to find such a matching (if exists).
Proof. Letw∗ be the maximum weight of a matching in G. Let
Ip = [ap ,bp ], where bp ≤ |Vp |. We extend G = (V ,E) to a graph G
as follows. For p = 1, . . . ,n, we add a set Bp of |Vp | − bp new
i2
i1
j2
j1
i3
1
1
1
3
2
2
11
5
i2
i1
j2
j1
i3
2
4
2
Figure 3: A compatibility graph (D,w) and its undirected
graph (D,w). Let M1 = {i2j2} and M2 = {i1i2, j1j2}. Then
w(M1) = w(M2) = 4, andM = {M1,M2}. LetV1 = {i1, i2, i3} and
V2 = {j1, j2}. Then s1 (M1) = s2 (M1) = 1, and t1 (M1) = 3 and
t2 (M1) = 1, whereas s1 (M2) = s2 (M2) = t1 (M2) = t2 (M2) = 2.
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vertices, each of them joined to all vertices ofVp by edges of weight
we = 0. We also introduce a set Ap of bp − ap new vertices that are
completely joined to all vertices ofVp by edges of weightwe = 0. In
addition, all vertices in⋃p Ap are joined to each other by edges of
weightwe = 0. The original edges e ∈ E in G keep their (original)
weights, i.e.,we = we . In case the total number of vertices is odd,
we add an additional vertexv and join it by zero weight edges to all
vertices of⋃p Ap . This completes the description of (G,w ). Letw∗
denote the maximum weight of a perfect matching in G, which we
can compute in polynomial time [16, 28]. Hence, it suffices to show
there is a matchingM ∈ M with sp (M ) ∈ [ap ,bp ] for p = 1, . . . ,n
if and only ifw∗ = w∗.
“⇒:” Suppose there is a matching M ∈ M with sp (M ) ∈ [ap ,bp ]
for p = 1, . . . ,n. As M ∈ M, we have w (M ) = w∗. As sp ≤ bp , we
can match all vertices of Bp to Vp by all zero weight edges. Finally,
since sp ≥ ap , we can match all (at most bp −ap ) remaining vertices
in Vp from Ap . Thus, eventually, all vertices of Vp will get matched.
In case there are vertices in ⋃p Ap that are not yet matched, we
match these to each other and, in case their number is odd, to the
extra vertex v . This yields a perfect matching in G of weightw∗.
“⇐:” Supposew∗ = w∗. LetM be a corresponding perfect matching
in G of weight w∗. Let M := M ∩ E denote the corresponding
matching in G. AsM matches all vertices of Bp into Vp , we know
thatM leaves at least |Vp | −bp vertices unmatched. Hence, sp (M ) ≤
bp as required. Similarly, since all vertices of Vp are matched byM
and at most |Vp | − bp + bp − ap = |Vp | − ap vertices in Vp can be
matched to Bp ∪Ap , we find thatM matches at least ap vertices in
Vp , so sp (M ) ≥ ap , as required. □
Corollary 5.2. For up = sp , Allocation Approximation is
polynomial-time solvable.
We now consider the case where up = tp and recall that for
up = tp , Allocation Approximation is polynomial-time solvable
if n = 1 or w ≡ 1 on D. We show the following result (proof
omitted).
Theorem 5.3. For up = tp , Allocation Approximation is
polynomial-time solvable for matching games, or equivalently, if
all country sizes are 1.
In what follows below, some instances will make use of reduc-
tions from the NP-complete problem Partition [19], which is to
decide if there is a set I ⊆ {1, . . . ,k } with a(I ) = 12
∑k
i=1 ai for some
given tuple of k integers a1, . . . ,ak .
Theorem 5.4. For up = tp , Allocation Approximation is NP-
complete even if n = 2.
Proof. We show the statement even for δ = 0. We reduce from
Partition. From an instance (a1, . . . ,ak ) of Partition we con-
struct a generalized matching game (N ,v ) with n = 2. We define
countries V1 = {v1, . . . ,vk ,v ′1, . . . ,v ′k } and V2 = {v ′′1 , . . . ,v ′′k }. For
i = 1, . . . ,k we have arcs (vi ,v ′i ), (v ′i ,vi ), (vi ,v ′′i ) and (v ′′i ,vi ),
each with weight ai . Any maximum weight matchingM matches
each vi with either v ′i or v ′′i . Matching vi with v ′i adds 2ai to coun-
tryV ′1 s utility (and 0 to the utility ofV2), while matchingvi withv ′′i
adds ai to both the utility of V1 and V2. Note that v (N ) = 2
∑
j aj .
Let x be the allocation with x1 = 32
∑
j aj and x2 = 12
∑
j aj . Then
there exists a matchingM ∈ M with t1 (M ) = x1 and t2 (M ) = x2 if
and only if (a1, . . . ,ak ) is a yes-instance of Partition. □
As in the setting of international KEPs sparsely weighted games
are relevant, in the remainder of our paper we consider such cases.
Theorem 5.5. For up = tp , Allocation Approximation is NP-
complete even if the number of weights in the computability graph
and its underlying graph is 2.
Proof. We show the statement even for δ = 0. We reduce from 3-
Partition, which is to decide if we can partition a set of 3k positive
integers a1, . . . ,a3k , with
∑3k
p=1 ap = kc for some integer c , into k
sets that each sum up to c . This problem is stronglyNP-complete (so
NP-complete even when encoded in unary) even if 14c < ai <
1
2c ,
ensuring that each set in a solution has size exactly 3 [19].
From an instance (a1, . . . a3k ) with 14c < ai <
1
2c we construct a
generalized matching game (N ,v ) on a compatibility graph (D,A)
as follows. We start with 3k sources. For p = 1, . . . ,k let Sp :=
{sp , s ′p , s ′′p } and S :=
⋃
p Sp . Add a set of 3k sinks T := {z1, . . . , z3k }.
Join all sources to all sinks by (3k )2 pairwise internally vertex
disjoint paths: from each sp (s ′p , s ′′p ) there is a path Ppq (P ′pq , P ′′pq ) to
each zq of length 2aq − 1. Any two consecutive vertices on the path
are joined by two opposite arcs of equal weight. The weights on
each path alternate between L and L + 1, starting and ending with
L+1, where L ≫ 0 is sufficiently large, say, L > kc . For p = 1, . . . ,k ,
let Vp =
⋃
q (Ppq ∪ P ′pq ∪ P ′′pq ) \T and let Vk+1 = T .
As L ≫ 0, every maximumweight matchingM in the underlying
graph D = (V ,E) is perfect. More precisely,M looks as follows. For
p = 1, . . . ,k there are three paths Ppq from sp to zq , P ′pq′ from s
′
p
to zq′ , and P ′′pq from s ′′p to zq′′ that are completely matched in the
sense thatM ∩ Ppq is a perfect matching of Ppq (and similarly for
P ′pq and P ′′pq ), contributing a gain of (2(aq + aq′ + aq′′ ) − 3) (L + 1)
to up (M ). Furthermore, there are (3k − 3) paths from sp to the
remaining 3k − 3 sinks inT \ {zq , zq′ , zq′′ } that start and end with a
non-matching edge (and are otherwiseM-alternating). These paths
(emanating from sp ) contribute a total of 2L(
∑
r<{q,q′,q′′ } (ar −1)) =
2L(∑r ar − (aq + aq′ + aq′′ ) − (3k − 3)) to up (M ). So tp (M ) =
2(aq + aq′ + aq′′ ) + 2L(
∑
ar ) − 6L(k − 1) for p = 1, . . . ,k . Let x be
the allocation with xp = 2c + 2L(
∑
ar ) − 6L(k − 1) for p = 1, . . . ,k
and xk+1 = 3k ((3k − 1)L+L+ 1). Then there is a matchingM ∈ M
with tp (M ) = xp for p = 1, . . . ,k + 1 if and only if (a1, . . . ,a3k )
is a yes-instance of 3-Partition. As 3-Partition is strongly NP-
complete, a1, . . . ,a3k can be represented in unary. Thus, the size
of the instance of 3-Partition is kc . Hence, (D,w ) has polynomial
size. □
Note that the number of countries in Theorem 5.5 can be arbi-
trarily large. By a “compact description” of a game defined on a
graph we mean a logarithmic description of the graph (if possible).
For example, a cycle of length k can be described by its length,
which results in input size O (logk ) rather than k .
Theorem 5.6. For up = tp , Allocation Approximation is NP-
complete even for compact generalized matching games with three
different weights and country sizes ≤ 2.
Proof. We show the statement even for δ = 0. We reduce
again from the NP-complete Partition problem [19]. From an
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M :
L + 1 L + 1 L + 12 L +
1
2
L LL L L + 1 L + 1 L + 1
L + 1 L + 1 L + 1 L L LL L L L + 1 L + 1
L + 1L
V1 V2
M ′ :
L + 1 L + 1 L + 12 L +
1
2
L LL L L + 1 L + 1 L + 1
L + 1 L + 1 L + 1 L L LL L L L + 1 L + 1
L + 1L
V1 V2
Figure 4: C = Ci for ai = 5 with edges e and e in the middle.
instance (a1, . . . ,ak ) of Partitionwe construct a compact general-
ized matching game (N ,v ) with number of weights 3 and country
sizes ≤ 2. We assume that k is even (otherwise add ak+1 = 0), that
the size of I is |I | = k/2 (otherwise add a large number to each ai )
and that every ai is odd (otherwise replace every ai by 2ai + 1).
LetC = Ci be an even cycle of length 4ai + 4. Let e and e be two
opposite edges. Assign weights we = L and we = L + 1 to these
edges, where L > 0 is large, say, L = ∑ai . Weightswe andwe are
assumed to be split equally to their corresponding two opposite
arcs. Removing e and e splits C into two paths P1 and P2 of length
2ai +1 each. The edge weights on these two paths alternate between
L and L+ 1 except for their last edge, which has weight L+ 12 . More
precisely, P1 starts with an edge (say, incident to e) of weight L + 1
and continues alternating between edges of weight L + 1 and L
until its last edge (incident to e) gets weight L + 12 (instead of L + 1).
Similarly, P2 starts with an edge of weight L, incident to e , and
alternates between weights L + 1 and L until the last edge gets
weight L + 12 (instead of L). See Figure 4 for the case where ai = 5.
We letU1 andU2 denote the vertex sets of P1 and P2, respectively.
For L suitably large,C has exactly two maximum weight matchings,
namely its two complementary perfect matchingsM andM ′, where
M is the perfect matching that matches both e and e andM ′ is the
complement of M . We compute: t1 (M ) = 12L +
1
2 (L + 1) + aiL =
L(ai +1)+ 12 , t2 (M ) =
1
2L+
1
2 (L+1)+ai (L+1) = L(ai +1)+
1
2 +ai ,
t1 (M ′) = L(ai + 1) + 12 + ai , and t2 (M ′) = L(ai + 1) +
1
2 .
Recall that we have k such components Ci , each with two com-
plementarymaximumweight (perfect) matchings. So in the graphG
consisting of these k components Ci we have 2k maximum weight
matchings, obtained by picking one of the two complementary M
and M in each Ci . Let V1 be the union of all the U1s in each Ci
and V2 be the union of all the U2s. Consider the allocation x with
x1 = x2 = L(
∑
ai + 1) + 12
∑
ai + k/2 and assume these can be real-
ized by a suitable maximum matching. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . ,k } be the set
of indices i such that the matching picksM in Ci . With respect to
this matching,V1 has utility L
∑
(ai +1)+k/2+
∑
I ai . Such a match-
ing exists if and only if (a1, . . . ,ak ) is a yes-instance of Partition.
This completes the reduction. Each component Ci of the graph we
construct has a description of length O (log(kamax )), where amax
denotes the maximum ai ; note that L is bounded by log(kamax ) and
the length ofCi is bounded by ai . Hence, allowing compact descrip-
tions, the weighted graph we constructed has sizeO (k log(kamax )),
which is polynomial in the size of (a1, . . . ,ak ). □
We now consider the case where n = 2 and w ≡ 1 on (D,w )
but the computability graph (D,w ) itself has two different weights.
We do not solve this case, but link it to Exact Perfect Matching
introduced in [31]. This problem has as input an undirected graphG
whose edge set is partitioned into a set R of red edges and a set B of
blue edges. The question is whether G has a perfect matching with
exactly k red edges for some given integer k . The complexity status
of Exact Perfect Matching is a longstanding open problem, and
so far only partial results were shown (see, for example, [22]).
Let D = (V ,A) be a compatibility graph D = (V ,A), in which all
2-cycles on vertices i, j have weights wi j = 13 and w ji =
2
3 . Note
that w ≡ 1 in the underlying weighted graph (D,w ). In fact the
exact values of wi j and w ji = 1 − wi j do not matter, as long as
they differ from 12 (if w ≡ 12 on D, then tp (M ) = sp (M ) and we
can apply Corollary 5.2). Let (V1,V2) be the country partition, such
that i ∈ V1, j ∈ V2 implies that wi j = 13 and w ji = 23 . Note that
edges inside V1 and V2 are also allowed. Moreover, we assume that
D has a perfect matching. Asw ≡ 1 in D, the setM of maximum
weight matchings of D consists of all perfect matchings. We call the
generalized matching game (N ,v ) defined on such a compatibility
graph (D,w ) and (V1,V2) perfect. We show the following result
(proof omitted).
Theorem 5.7. Exact Perfect Matching and Allocation Ap-
proximation on perfect generalized matching games (N ,v ) are poly-
nomially equivalent.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Just as for other cooperative games (such as, flow games [18]), we
generalized matching games by allowing a player to own multiple
vertices. We showed that generalized matching games are equiva-
lent tob-matching games with respect to Core Non-Emptiness and
proved two complexity dichotomies. For the case with only 2-way
kidney exchanges, we used these games to model a credit system
in international Kidney Exchange Programs, introducing a credit
system for compensating unhappy countries in future rounds. This
led to the Allocation Approximation problem for computing ex-
change schemes as close as possible to some given allocation. If the
total number of incoming kidneys is the utility function, we gave
a polynomial-time algorithm. If instead their total weight is taken
as the utility function, we proved NP-hardness. For the latter case
the main open problem is to determine the complexity in case of
small country sizes; we could only show NP-hardness for compact
encodings.
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